## Orientalism Updates

## Orientalism supplements

### Russia threat is real

#### **The Russian cyber threat is very real**

Kakaes 3/22(Konstantin Kakaes, 3-22-2022, "How real is Russia’s cyber threat?," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-nightly/2022/03/22/how-real-is-russias-cyber-threat-00019386)**//BRownRice**

WEB OF UNCERTAINTY — “As the world’s most technically advanced nation, the United States is also potentially the most vulnerable to foreign cyberthreats,” John Markoff warned in The New York Times more than two decades ago, in October 1999. Like the nuclear threat of the Cold War, which loomed over daily life for nearly half a century, the possibility of “simultaneous computer network attacks against banking, transportation, commerce and utility targets — as well as against the military,” as the Times put it long before the internet was a central to society as it is today, has become part of the backdrop of modern life. Those fears became more vivid — more real — than ever before on Monday evening, when President Joe Biden, addressing business leaders, said “the magnitude of Russia’s cyber capacity is fairly consequential and it’s coming.” Trillions of dollars have been spent on cybersecurity this century. Despite that, as a society, we are less resilient to cyberattacks today than we were in 1999. Ridesharing services that rely on networked communications and positioning systems have largely replaced taxis that relied on drivers who knew their way around; smartphones have become essential to the conduct of business; even grocery stores are growing dependent on sophisticated computational surveillance systems. Even so, it is hard to know what to make of Biden’s warning. On the one hand, he is privy to secret intelligence, and that intelligence was right about Vladimir Putin’s willingness to invade Ukraine with an army of tanks and airplanes. On the other, cyber pundits have so far been mistaken about the cyberwar that was supposed to accompany Putin’s Ukraine invasion. “They will do things that will ruin people and cause great harm. This is a serious thing. It’s not just about making the lights go on and off,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, told POLITICO’s Maggie Miller in January. And Jonathan Reiber, the former chief strategy officer for cyber policy in Obama’s Pentagon said in January, “This may end up being the first declared hostility where cyberspace operations are a part of an integrated offensive military invasion.” That hasn’t happened. Even as Ukraine has been pummeled by bombs and artillery strikes, cyberattacks have been — so far — muted in Ukraine, and there haven’t yet been any notable attacks on the U.S. In an article coming Wednesday morning in POLITICO that examines why Russia hasn’t launched major cyberattacks in Ukraine (and is available to POLITICO Pro subscribers right now), Hodges acknowledges that the “cyber juggernaut” he expected never materialized. It’s unclear whether this is because Russia didn’t want to, or because it couldn’t. Russia’s brutal invasion has lacked strategic coherence, in the cyber realm as in others. Had cyberattacks made it harder for Ukrainians to communicate, it seems inevitable that Volodymyr Zelenskyy would have been less effective at drumming up international support for Ukraine. The exact extent of Russia’s cyber capabilities remains opaque. If Russia is capable of a serious cyberattack against the U.S., then now, after Russia has been frustrated in its attempt to swiftly conquer Ukraine, could be the moment when it comes. Because cyberattacks are generally difficult to definitively attribute, they could provide a way for Putin to bring the war to Americans while making it difficult for U.S. policymakers to retaliate in kind. Plus, as Biden said Monday, in the U.S. it’s the private sector, not the government, that largely decides “the protections we will or will not take” against cyberattacks that might disrupt our electricity or our water supplies. He called on business leaders to do their part to “secure every American’s privacy.” So far, since Markoff’s essay in 1999, the possibility of what was then called an electronic Pearl Harbor, and more recently a cyber Pearl Harbor, has remained just that: a possibility. The cyberattacks that have taken place, like the Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, have been headaches for their targets but not world-historical catastrophes. If a momentous, long-feared attack from Russia does come, that could change. The world could be reshaped in unpredictable ways, as it was after Sept. 11, 2001, and as it was after the onset of the pandemic. Cyberattacks can have temporary effects, or they can have more lasting ones. A blackout that lasted months would transform life, as food spoiled and hospital generators ran out of gas, and might be treated as an act of war. To be clear, these are purely speculative threats. They don’t seem realistic, nor worth worrying about. Planning for very low probability but very high impact events — a cyber black swan — is nearly impossible. It feels a little irresponsible even to speculate about them. But then, the idea that the world would endure nearly two years of lockdowns as businesses shut globally once seemed far-fet ched too.

#### Russia threat real

Mcinnis and Fata 5/20 (Kathleen J. Mcinnis, Daniel Fata, 5-20-2022, "Russia Is a Real Threat to NATO," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/20/russia-threat-nato-madrid-summit/)**//BRownRice**

Recent events in Ukraine have once again proved that reports of NATO’s death are an exaggeration. Many leaders across the alliance have been quick to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with aid to Kyiv, increases in their own country’s defense budgets, or both. But as the war grinds on and the geopolitical reality of an adversarial relationship with Russia sets in, NATO must once again take the longer view on what all this means for trans-Atlantic and global security. Conveniently, in less than two months, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid to endorse the alliance’s new strategy. The key question, therefore, is whether member states will use the moment to reforge NATO’s raison d’être to meet current and future challenges—in particular, by naming Russia as a threat to the alliance itself. Given the implications of Ukraine for European and global order, the stakes could hardly be higher. Some take the view that Madrid should mark a reprioritization of U.S. efforts away from Europe and back toward Asia. Their logic goes that not only is European defense spending increasing, but Russia has also demonstrated ineptitude in the prosecution of its war in Ukraine. That means the longer-term need for significant U.S. forces in Europe has also therefore declined. And, after all, China is the pacing threat for Department of Defense planning. In fact, the opposite is true. For starters, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it abundantly clear that he views NATO as a strategic threat. Recent events suggest we should take these statements at face value. In the runup to the current war, some analysts developed elaborate rationales for why the buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border didn’t mean an invasion was coming, such as a strengthened negotiating position vis-à-vis Ukraine’s future political directions. Another Russian invasion of Ukraine was so obviously strategically counterproductive that there must have been another reason for the buildup. In the event, there wasn’t. Expand your perspective with unlimited access to FP. SUBSCRIBE NOW And while Russian military incompetence has been startling, planners shouldn’t leap to conclusions. Russian forces were not able to capture Kyiv, but they have been able to seize tens of thousands of square miles of territory along Ukraine’s eastern border—at least for now. Estonia, a Baltic NATO member that borders Russia, is less than 20,000 square miles in size. Militaries can also reform, especially after disaster, as Ukraine’s own army did after its failures in 2014. The United States has good reasons to want to keep NATO vibrant: The strategic benefits of U.S. leadership are manifold. Not only does American leadership in NATO provide pathways for organizing military coalitions, but it also affords the United States privileged status on trade partnerships and access to bases. If Putin achieves his aim of discrediting NATO, this could lead to trans-Atlantic strategic insolvency: a situation whereby allies, including the United States, are unable to meet their security obligations and, relatedly, maintain favorable standards of living for their populations. Which brings us back to Madrid. The last time that NATO agreed on a strategic concept was in 2010. It is a document that specified that, among other things, defense of allied territory remains a critical mission for the alliance, but it is silent on naming nation-state threats to NATO. For a variety of domestic and international political reasons, building formal consensus on threats among 30 allied states is extremely challenging. Indeed, in the 2010 document Russia is viewed as an aspirational partner for NATO when it comes to European security—despite the warning sign of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the intervening years, Russia has conducted destabilizing disinformation campaigns in NATO states and has attacked Ukraine twice. And while NATO leaders have condemned Russian aggression, the rhetoric falls short of formally declaring Russia as a long-term strategic threat to the alliance. Durable consensus requires clarity. To prepare NATO to contend with this threat over the long term requires a frank admission of the strategic realities that Russia poses in the alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted in Madrid. As a practical matter, this will commit NATO members to take budgeting, force planning, acquisition, and possible troop repositioning seriously—and put teeth into the declaration. This is needed for NATO planners to determine, for example, whether spending 2 percent of GDP on defense is sufficient to meet the challenges to the alliance. But the real value of the document is what the collective members reaffirm as to what NATO continues to stand for, what it calls out as the threats to the member territory, and what it intends to do to address, deter, and, if necessary, defend against these threats. By stating up front that Russia is a formal threat, member states—and the alliance as a whole—will find it harder to backslide from their current cohesion. It is difficult to overstate how important it is for NATO to ensure its consensus is durable; as the war grinds on and publics begin feeling the economic effects of the conflict and sanctions on Russia, the temptation to dilute support to Ukraine will undoubtedly mount. Not to mention, calling it like it is will send an important message to Putin: NATO will not be deterred. Words matter. It is time for NATO leaders to formally accept reality: Putin is a threat to the alliance and its members, and, therefore, they should declare so in the news strategic concept. Indeed, not declaring Russia a formal threat to NATO territory would compromise NATO’s credibility and would give Putin a pass for the atrocities and violations he has committed in Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the United States can afford to allow that to happen.

### Ballot key/ballot good

#### Accumulating ballots is good and key because it forces engagement with our method – simply modelling USFG policy replicates the racist tendencies of the state and forcing us to engage with it is equally harmful

Reid Brinkey 8(THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE, Shanara Rose Reid Brinkley, 2008, Page 114-115)**//BRownRice**

Signifyin’ on institutional symbols of American democracy, Jones’ draws attention to the parallels in power structures between the federal government and the decision-making arms of the debate community. The “halls of Congress” represent the halls of debate tournaments. “Capitol Hill” where the laws of this country are enacted is a metaphor for debate tournament tabrooms where wins and losses are catalogued. Tournament ballots metaphorically represent the signing of the judges ballot at the conclusion of debates. In facts, debaters often argue that the “impacts” they identify or the solvency for their plan happens “once the judge signs the ballot,” as if assigning a winner or loser actually results in the passage of a policy. Jones argues that it is the ballot that is the most significant tool in influencing the practices and procedures of the community. In other words, the competitive nature of debate guarantees that teams and coaches remain responsive to trends amongst the judging pool. Ultimately, debate competition is a run to capture or win the judges ballot. That the ballot “enacts” the “policies” of the debate “community,” makes the space of competition a critical arena from which to attempt community change. Up until this point, the policy debate community had dealt with issues of diversity and inclusion outside of tournament competition. Directors, coaches, assistants, and debaters may have engaged in outreach and recruitment practices designed to diversify the debate community, but discussions and support for such actions were not generated from debate tournament competition. Those discussions occurred in collaborative versus competitive settings where stakeholders were encouraged to dialogue without concern for winners or losers. For example, OSI (the original non-profit arm of the UDL) sponsored Ideafests to bring stakeholders in the debate community together to discuss the national expansion of the UDL. Thus, Green’s following argument during tournament competition directly violates the traditional practice of discussing issues of diversity and inclusion in the community, outside of competitive debate rounds: Racism is one of the leading exports of the United States Federal Government and it exploits it on to other countries. It doesn’t acknowledge its problems at home and the debate community replicates those values by playing in this fantasy world that we cannot change. By sitting silent, by not acknowledging, or addressing the problems within this community. It is easy for us to say that there are problems racism and sexism but the problem comes when we recognize those systemic issues and do nothing to change our methods of how we challenge those problems.109 Green is holding the debate community accountable for its failure in significantly increasing diversity and inclusion. They hold teams accountable for their methodological choices in debate participation forcing other teams and judges to consider whether or not the traditional or normative ways of engaging in competition result in an activity and environment hostile to those debate bodies marked by difference. Let me remind you of the use of the term “export” in the previous quotation. Green argues that the US federal government “exports” American racism to other nations. Significantly, they argue that the debate community does the same. The Louisville debaters make a very controversial argument, one that if true, deeply wounds the debate community. They argue that the racism in the debate community, just like U.S. institutional racism, is exported to the UDL. Note this excerpt from Jones: And, I gave an example of the Urban Debate Leagues, how people don’t recognize how they export these type of oppressions onto Urban Debate Leagues, when they assume that they are ignorant and have nothing to contribute to this activity. So they teach them how to debate, never realize that they know how to debate in the first place. This is the example, these is the ways in which we have to change the social structures and the power relations that affect our world.”110 As I stated earlier in this chapter, it is largely the development of the UDL and its representations within the debate community that led to the creation of the Louisville Project. Remember that the UDL is often held as the communal exemplar that demonstrates the policy debate community’s commitment to diversity and inclusion. Thus, to argue that the debate community perpetuates institutional racism even while acting against it is a confrontational stance for the Project members.

#### Challenging the state is key

Lisa Yoneyama 16, 9-8-2016, "Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes," Duke University Press, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1215/9780822374114>, kav

Importantly, the redress activism reinvigorated in the United States since the turn of the new century has enlisted Asian/Americans as new subjects of historical justice.2 Underpinning reemerging memories of Japanese imperial violence and the impetus to seek redress in the U.S. judicial system is the heightened presence of Asian immigrant-citizen-subjects and their growing importance in American representative politics. The demographic shift in the U.S. body politic is one crucial factor in the belated but increasing Asian/American presence in redress activism. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act abolished ethnonational and racial quotas, leading to a dramatic increase in immigration from Asia. Many new immigrants carried with them traumatic memories of suffering and loss wrought by Japanese colonialism as well as Japanese military invasions before and during the Asia-Pacific War. Much of the institutional drive for redress therefore comes from California and other North American locations where new and old Asian populations now pose a significant representational force. The Alliance for Preserving the Truth of Sino-Japanese War, the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of wwII in Asia (ga), and the Association for Learning and Preserving the History of wwII in Asia (alpha)—three overlapping North American network organizations demanding redress and apologies from the Japanese government and corporations not exclusively but largely for Chinese victims of Japan’s aggressive war—are particularly noteworthy. Prompted by the publication of Iris Chang’s Rape of Nanking: Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (1997), these organizations have also successfully mobilized the nineties discourse of international criminal justice and human rights to target Japanese war crimes.3 With regard to “comfort women” redress, Korean/American and Asian/American transnational feminists have deployed American juridical venues, legislatures, communities, social media, and spaces of cultural production to disseminate memories of the Japanese military’s sex trafficking and forced prostitution throughout the empire. In ways that were not possible in the immediate aftermath of the war, Asian/Americans have emerged as new subjects of justice in the U.S. polity. The increasing visibility of Asian/Americans in U.S. redress culture at the same time reminds us of the ways in which the constitution of U.S. public institutions and discourses has been a racialized process. 4 More urgently, attention to the racial differences among subjects who pursue redress calls into question the history of the uneven distribution of power within America’s nationalized liberal public sphere, forcing us to understand that reparation issues concern more than interstate normalization and reconciliation. Transborder redress culture affects colonial diasporic peoples as well as refugees and migrants who were violently uprooted by colonialism and war, and who became further displaced in many cases as a result of the political and economic disfranchisement they experienced in the process of decolonization. In analyzing the Americanization of Japanese war crimes, the redress practices of colonial diasporic and migrant peoples emerge as critical terrains of possibility and scrutiny for transnational practices seeking historical justice. Americanization’s new phase, at least in the above sense, thus registers the nationalization of Asian transnational migrants. Through subjectification to U.S. judicial, legislative, and other state apparatuses of knowledge, Asian immigrant-citizens are not only beckoned to speak as owners of and witnesses to memories of Japanese imperial violence in Asia. They also become speaking subjects by subjecting themselves to the institutional arrangements that enable their speech and visibility, but only to the extent to which they are recognized by the given parameters of historical knowledge and the idea of justice. The exploration of Japan’s historical revisionists in the previous chapter demonstrated that National History performs a vital function as a normative epistemic apparatus that disciplines and interpellates nationalized citizen-subjects through mobilizing them toward the proper recitation of the nation’s honorable and supposedly uniformly shared past. The normative remembering of the nation’s past is intimately linked to the management of knowledge and subjectivities. Given such inseparable relationships among nationalism, normativity of citizenship, history, power, and knowledge, what are the ramifications of memories of Japanese imperial violence that travel from Asia and then become integrated with hegemonic American war memories and the persistent American discourse on historical justice? What type of political subject might we anticipate this process interpellates? The special issue of the Journal of Asian American Studies, published in 2003, on “Korean Comfort Women” addressed precisely this question by focusing on the Asian American investment in Japan’s wartime military “comfort women” issue. Guest-edited by the American literary critic Kandice Chuh, the special issue was based on an Association for American Studies (asa) session, titled “Siting/Citing ‘Comfort Women’ Critically: Transnational Memories in Korea-Japan-U.S. Liaisons.”5 In her essay theorizing the Asian American investment in Japan’s wartime military “comfort women” issue, Chuh raised a fundamental question regarding Asian Americanists’ objectification of “comfort women.”6 Chuh examined the literary representation of comfort women by the works of two Korean American authors, Comfort Woman (1998), by Nora Okja Keller, and A Gesture Life (2000), by ChangRae Lee, calling into question the “highly troubling ideological and political ends” the Asian American knowledge of “comfort women” might accommodate (8). Laura H. Y. Kang’s essay in the special issue likewise problematized the Americanization of Korean “comfort women” and its effect on knowledge and power.7 Asking “who are and should be the ‘we’ who must remember and represent this subject,” Kang argued for the urgent need to attend to the “multiple mediations and disciplinizations” (28) that are integral to the economy of Americanized “comfort women” knowledge, or the process she saw as “the various conjurings of ‘comfort women’” (46). As an alternative to such an Americanization of “comfort women” discourse, Kang calls our attention to the issue of class, suggesting the need to consider “what U.S. citizenship might mean not only for differently racialized and gendered but also differently capitalized subjects” (47). The investigations into the new phase of the Americanization of memories of Japanese imperial violence and the historical justice they call for can most productively yield critical politico-intellectual outcomes when situated in the perspectives put forward by the above Asian/American interventions. In keeping with Chuh’s and Kang’s theorizations, in what follows I explore the not-so-uniform effects of Asian/American mobilization into redress efforts within the U.S. public sphere. I will focus on juridicohistorical discourse—a nexus of power and historical knowledge produced by juridical practices—and intend to closely examine the ways in which Asian/Americans are erected as the law’s agent-subject who enunciates, enacts, or at other times defers, not a single but multiple ideas of historical justice. American discourse on Japanese war crimes is profoundly shaped by U.S. nationalism and assumptions about modernity, liberalism, colonialism, and postcoloniality that are embedded in Cold War epistemologies. Asian/America, as a discursively constituted terrain, is deeply implicated in this knowledge production.8 And yet Asian/Americans as new subjects of justice animated by the power invested in them as American citizen-subjects also necessarily illuminate contradictions of transnationality within the American civic sphere in such a way that they hold out the possibility of a radical politicization of justice and a critique of Americanization.9 Asian/American involvement in redress unveils, often inadvertently, the long history of entanglements and the complicity of imperial violence, as well as the amnesia about these matters between Japan and the United States. In this process, juridico-historical discourse may produce new subjects and publicity that transnationally rally around antiracist, decolonial notions of history and justice. At the same time, however, this process is not automatic or easily decipherable. Asian/Americans, as the agent-subjects of U.S. state apparatuses, tend to secure their nationalized status by underwriting America’s Cold War myth of liberation and rehabilitation vis-à-vis Asia. The North American liberal, multicultural nationalism, moreover, has effectively mobilized Asian ethnonationalisms as an enabling constituent element. Continuing the work of the previous chapters, in the following I seek out an analytic with which we might discern the risks, the possibilities, and the multiple and contested implications of this seemingly new phase in the Americanization of justice.

#### **Marxism is blatantly orientalist – proves the alt fails and serves as an impact turn to the alt**

Lindner 21(Kolja Lindner, KOLJA LINDNER is a lecturer (maître de conférences) in German political theory at the Université Paris 8. His research interests lie broadly in political theory and social inequality, postcolonialism, secularism, and Marx. His major publications include Marx, Marxism and the Question of Eurocentrism (forthcoming), Le dernier Marx (edited, 2019), and Die Hegemoniekämpfe in Frankreich: Laizismus, politische Repräsentation und Sarkozysmus (2017).,12-1-2021, "Hegemonic Orientalism and Historical Materialism," No Publication, https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article/4/3/517/294165)**//BRownRice**

Said makes two criticisms of Marx. (1) According to Said, Marx advances “the notion of an Asiatic economic system in his 1853 analyses of British rule in India”2 as well as the idea of a “fundamentally lifeless Asia” (O, 154). Both notions are by this account “perfectly fitted . . . to a standard Orientalist undertaking” (O, 154)—that is, to an effort “to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (O, 3). This view was based on “Romantic and even messianic” (O, 154) sources of the kind that Said locates in Goethe's West-östlicher Diwan. (2) For Said, a contradiction arises as “Marx's moral equation of Asiatic loss with the British colonial rule he condemned gets skewed back towards the old inequality between East and West” (O, 154). Against the backdrop of an essentialist homogenization, Marx severely downplayed the suffering of colonized people: “They are Orientals and hence have to be treated in other ways” (O, 155). He reconciled condemnation and affirmation of “the human depredation introduced into [the Asiatic] system by English colonial interference, rapacity, and outright cruelty” (O, 155) through the notion of the “historical necessity” (O, 153) of a social transformation in Asia.